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Oct., 1951
PLEADINGS, RULES 7 TO 25
By WINSTON S. HOWARD
of the Denver Bar
Proper pleading is an art. It is no less so under the Rules
than under the Code. The difference in the pleadings under the
Rules and under the Code is that under the Code the real object of
pleading was lost sight of. Under the Rules, purpose of pleading,
which is to inform parties of the issues to be tried, is primary.
Rules governing pleadings are found in Rules 7 to 25. They
will be discussed in their order:
RULE 7. There are only three pleadings: *a complaint, an
answer, and a reply. A reply is not required or allowed, except by
order of court. Applications to the court for orders are to be
made by written motion, which can be incorporated in the notice
of hearing of the motion or the notice of application to set the
same for hearing. This Rule is not used enough. It is possible
under it to have the motion and the notice in one document, with
a saving of repetition in several ways. Motions during a hearing
or trial can be made orally, but this is intended to cover the usual
trial motions, such as motions to strike, motions for directed ver-
dict, mistrial, for judgment, etc. Some cases indicate that a motion
made even during a trial, which is not of this kind, should be made
in writing, and, in such evpnt, the requirement of notice would
probably apply.
There is provision made for the submission of a controversy
to a court without pleadings and upon an agreed statement of
facts. This provision is little used, but could provide a ready and
inexpensive means of submitting a simple dispute.
RULE 8. The prime rule of all pleading under the Rules is
stated in the requirement that pleadings set forth "a short and
plain statement of the claim." The principle of this Rule is that
it provides for notice pleading and is, as now well settled, that
it is not necessary to spell out in minute detail the theory of the
action as it was in Code plea4ing. But it is still necessary that the
complaint aver (not allege) facts which, if true, entitle plaintiff
to relief. The "claim" must be set out so that the court can know
what is involved, so that the counsel for the defendant can know
the issues presented, and so that the doctrines of stare decisis
and res judicata can be applied. The elements essential to entitle
the pleader to relief must appear. The pleader must ask for the
relief to which he thinks he is entitled, but it may be done in the
alternative or it may be of several different types. Moreover the
cases hold that the pleader is not bound by the relief prayed for, but
will be granted that to which the facts entitle him.
Defenses are required to set forth likewise in "short and plain
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terms." If the pleader is without knowledge or information suffi-
cient to form a belief as to the truth of an averment, a statement
to that effect is a denial of the averment. Pleaders are required
by the Rule to admit all matters averred in the complaint which
in good faith the pleader does not intend to controvert. And the
obligations of Rule 11 relating to the good faith of the pleader
are specifically made to apply to answers.
The pleadings, as clarified, abridged, or enlarged at the pre-
trial conference and as amended to fit the proof under Rule 15,
must set forth a claim and must controvert the claims made and
thus define the issues to be be tried. It is upon these issues so
defined that the decision of the court or jury is to be had, and it
is these pleadings and pre-trial orders to which one must look to
decide the issues which were determined. Pleadings are still im-
portant.
It is suggested that the avoidance of the phrase "cause of
action" and, instead, the use of the word "claim" will be helpful
in keeping in mind the distinction which now exists. There is
no longer a "cause of action". This is true, even though the
Supreme Court sometimes talks of "causes of actions" in dis-
cussing the sufficiency of complaints under the Rules.
Subsection (c) requires that affirmative defenses be set forth
in pleading to a preceding pleading. In addition to the affirmative
defenses set forth in the Rule, it has been held that last clear
chance, laches, mitigation of damages, statute of frauds, and lien
waiver must be affirmatively pleaded.
I think that, in order to be safe, a plaintiff should secure an
order permitting him to reply if he wishes to raise any affirmative
defense to a matter set forth in the defendant's answer. Rule
7 (d) states that averments in a pleading to which no responsive
pleading is "required or permitted" are taken as denied or avoided.
It does not seem to me that a reply setting up an affirmative de-
fense is required by 7 (c). Rule 12 (b) seems to carry that idea
forward in providing that defenses "shall be asserted in the re-
sponsive pleading thereto if one is required." But our Supreme
Court has in three cases cast doubt on this point. (See Trustee
Co. v. Bresnahan, 119 Colo. 311; Markley v. Hilkey Bros., 113
Colo. 562; Rice v. Farmers State Bank, 221 P. (2) 378.)
The averments of pleadings are required to be simple, con-
cise, and direct. If the pleader is without direct knowledge of
the fact, averments may be made upon information and belief;
and it is sufficient if it is said, "upon information and belief,"
and then set out the fact. It is not necessary that pleadings set
forth ultimate facts, but they may include conclusions of law.
Neither claims nor defenses need to be consistent one with another.
RULE 9. It is no longer necessary to aver capacity or authority
of one suing in a representative capacity or the legal existence
of organized associations. So, an executor need not set forth his
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right to bring suit or defend, nor need the incorporation of a cor-
poration be averred.
An averment that all conditions precedent have been performed
or have occurred is sufficient. A denial of such an averment of
performance must be with particularity, and the burden of proof
is upon the party pleading performance. It is not upon the one
averring with particularity that a performance has not been made.
I am not sure just how this works in practice. Apparently the
one pleading performance would be obliged to establish perform-
ance in the particulars denied, but not otherwise. Provision re-
lating to burden of proof is not found in the Federal Rules, and
there does not appear to have been any State court construction
of it.
A requirement of some importance is that of 9 (g), which
is that items of special damage must be specifically stated. It has
frequently been held that this can be compelled by a motion under
Rule 12 (e). The other provisions of the Rule are clear and cover
special situations.
RULE 10. Rule 10 relates to the names of the parties and in
(b) requires the numbering of paragraphs. This is not always
done, but should be, because the Rule provides that a paragraph
may be referred to by number in all succeeding pleadings, which
is a great convenience. It is a requirement that each claim founded
upon a separate transaction or occurrence and each defense shall
be stated in a separate count or defense. The practice seems to
be to designate such separated claims as "First Claim, Second
Claim, etc.," rather than as "First Count, Second Count, etc."
The Rule allows the accepted practice of adopting parts of a plead-
ing by reference in the same pleading, in other pleadings, or in
motions. It also makes an exhibit to a pleading a part thereof
for all purposes.
RULE 11. Rule 11 is important in that it makes the signature
of an attorney to a pleading a certificate by him that he has read
the pleading, that there is good ground to support it, and that it
is not interposed for delay. The Rule is not as broad as it ought
to be, because seldom are pleadings interposed for delay, but, quite
often, motions are.
RULE 12. Rule 12 is an important rule. It provides that de-
fenses and objections may be presented by the responsive plead-
ing if one is required. Since a motion is not a pleading, the Rule
provides that certain defenses may be presented by motion. They
include: insufficient or improper venue, service or process or lack
or jurisdiction, and failure to state a claim or to join an indis-
pensable party. All such motions available must be made together
and before pleading. Otherwise, they are waived, except that fail-
ure to state a claim may be raised at almost any stage of the pro-
ceedings. Filing any such motion changes the time for filing a
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responsive pleading. It should be noted that it is only the motions
permitted by Rule 12 that have such effect. For example, a motion
for a physical examination does not change the pleading time.
It is not required that any of the defenses set out in Rule 12
must be presented by motion. They may be all joined together
in the responsive pleading without waiver of any of them. But
if any of the objections, except that of failure to state a claim,
is made the subject of a motion, then such objections as are not
included within the motion are waived and cannot be raised by
pleading. This is requisite, because some objections must be made
on the ground that the responsive pleading cannot be prepared
without the information required. Therefore, such objection must
be available by motion. But if the pleading is prepared and filed
without this information, it would, of course, be absurd to have
such a motion included in the responsive pleading. Many pleaders
include in their responsive pleading a motion raising the point
of failure to state a claim, even though that same point has been
made and ruled upon adversely by motion.
Provision is made for what amounts in effect to a speaking
motion, in which, if the court sees fit, matters outside of the
pleading may be presented and considered. In such event, the
motion is considered to be a motion for summary judgment with
all the incidents thereof.
A motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint fails to
state a claim raises the question of the legal sufficiency of the
complaint. To withstand such attack, the complaint must set forth
facts, together with legal conclusions if desired, which facts, if
taken as true, together with the correctly stated legal conclusions,
would entitle the pleader to some relief. Though no case has been
found, it seems that this statement must necessarily be true and
that not only the facts, but the legal conclusions, must be favor-
ably considered in determining the quality of the complaint.
Some Federal cases have held that a motion to dismiss a
complaint for insufficiency must set out wherein the pleading is
defective. This is based on the requirement of Rule 7 that motions
"shall state with particularity the grounds thereof." There seems
to me to be merit in this position, and certainly it would save
counsel much time and labor in preparing for argument in opposi-
tion to such a motion if the court were to require the particular
grounds to be made known.
The Rule provides that a motion for a separate statement
or bill of particulars may be filed. The motion for separate state-
ment and for bill of particulars has been eliminated from the
Federal Rules, though still retained in the State Rules. The office
of this motion is most doubtful, in view of the discovery provisions
of the Rules. If the requirement were adhered to that the motion
shall point out the defects complained of and the details desired,
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the motion would seldom be used. Its chief present use probably
is a dilatory one.
Note that a responsive pleading to which no motion under
12 (b) is available may be attacked for insufficiency by a motion
to strike under this Rule. Thus an answer or a reply may be at-
tacked for insufficiency.
RULE 13. Rule 13 relates to counterclaims and cross-claims.
These are divided into two catagories: permissive and compulsory.
And any claim arising out of the transaction which is the subject
of the complaint must be pleaded or is waived. The recent amend-
ment excepts counterclaims which were the subject of a pending
action at the time the suit was begun. Other claims may, at the
pleader's option, be pleaded. A counterclaim, of course, is a claim
set up by a defendant against a plaintiff. A cross-claim is a claim
set up by one party against a co-party (i.e., plaintiff against plain-
tiff or defendant against defendant). Cross-claims are entirely per-
missive. They must, however, either arise out of the transaction
which is the subject of the original action or relate to property
which is the subject of the action. They may be contingent in that
they may depend on the liability of the party to his opposing
party, which liability is to be determined in the action. So de-
fendant C may cross-claim against defendant D on the ground
that, if defendant C is liable to plaintiff, defendant D is liable to
defendant C for all or part of such claim.
Additional parties may be brought in, if necessary, to a de-
termination of a counterclaim or a cross-claim, and separate judg-
ments can be rendered.
RULE 14. Rule 14 relates to third party practice. This is de-
signed to permit complete disposition of a controversy between
several parties whose rights and liabilities are bound up in the
transaction, but which may vary between the parties.
The procedure is made clear from the amended Rule. If a
defendant considers another non-party to be liable to him for all
or part of any claim asserted by the plaintiff against him, that
defendant may bring into the case such other person and make him
a third party defendant. This can, also, be done by the third party
defendant bringing in another whom he, in turn, considers to be
liable for any claim established against such defendant. Third
party defendants can assert against the original plaintiff any
claims they may have arising out of the transaction, as well as
any defenses the third party plaintiff may have against the plain-
tiff's claim. Also, plaintiff may assert against third party de-
fendants any claims he may have against them. Thus, the ultimate
liable person is determined in one action.
RULE 15. Rule 15 relates to the amendment and supplement
to pleadings. It is a principle of the Rules that the issues pre-
sented by the pleadings, as affected by the pre-trial conference,
shall be the ones tried.
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Amendments or supplements to pleadings are allowed freely.
When parties have, by express or implied consent, tried issues
not raised by the pleadings or set up at the pre-trial, this Rule
provides for amendment of the pleadings to include such issues.
The answer to the question as to whether the unpleaded issue was
or was not tried by implied consent must depend upon the facts
of each case. It must, it seems, appear clearly that such unpleaded
issue was recognized by the court and parties and presented by
evidence deliberately included for the purpose of supporting or
denying that issue. It is certainly not within the intention of
this Rule that evidence not so introduced should be considered
as bearing upon an unpleaded issue to which it accidentally re-
lates. Provision is made for supplementing pleadings to set forth
transactions or occurrences or events happening since the filing
of the pleadings.
RULE 16. Rule 16 provides for pre-trial procedure. Much has
been said in favor of, and something has been said in opposition
to, pre-trial procedures. I am convinced that its merits are great
and its faults are minor. It seems to me that no case of any im-
portance should be tried until after a pre-trial conference has
been held. Pre-trial should be held after all pleadings are closed,
after the discovery procedures have been utilized, and at the time
when a trial date is about to ,be set. The court should not view
pre-trial as a perfunctory procedure to be gotten over as quickly
as possible, but as a valuable time- and expense-saving device.
Counsel should be encouraged to eliminate issues upon which no
real difference exists, to admit authenticity of documents, and to
identify proposed exhibits. Pre-trial orders should be prepared
by the court, and not by counsel, and should set forth the matters
determined at pre-trial. A proper use of pre-trial has been proved
to be- a means of saving a tremendous amount of time, effort, and
expense in the trial. Properly used, it should be a further means
of avoiding surprise at the trial.
RULE 17. "Parties Plaintiff and Defendant" is the subject of
Rule 17, which is substantially the same as under the Code.
RULE 18. Rule 18 makes it clear that a party may join in an
action as many claims as he has against another party. They do
not need to have arisen out of the same transaction or be in any
way related. All controversies between the parties may thus be
settled in one action. Further, a party need not prosecute one claim
to conclusion before proceeding upon a claiim based upon the prior
claim. So, a claim need not be reduced to judgment before an
action is brought to set aside a conveyance averred to be fraudulent.
RULE 19. Rule 19 is intended again to facilitate the full settle-
ment in one action of an entire controversy; so, parties having a
joint interest are (subject to Rule 23) made indispensable parties,
for the Rule says that they "shall" be made parties. "Desirable"
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or "proper" parties are those who ought to be joined if complete
relief is to be accorded between those already parties. They are
to be joined if feasible. If a person who should be a plaintiff de-
clines to join, he may be made a defendant; or, "in a proper case,"
he may be made an involuntary plaintiff. Such a proper case might
be where A is one of a group who are benefited by an agreement
made by X with Y; X declines to enforce the contract against Y,
which it is in A's interests to enforce. I think A could commence
an action against Y, joining X as an involuntary plaintiff.
RULE 20. Rule 20 permits joinder of all persons as plaintiff
or defendant if they assert or have asserted against them "any
right to relief jointly, severally, or arising out of the same trans-
action, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences and if
any question of law or fact common to all of them will arise in
any action." It is not necessary that any plaintiff or any defendant
be interested in all of the relief demanded. Judgment may be given
for such plaintiffs against such defendants as the proof requires.
Separate trials may be had. It is possible, under this Rule, to
sue joint or several obligees jointly or severally.
RULE 21. Rule 21 relates to misjoinder and non-joinder of
parties. Misjoinder of parties is not ground for dismissal. Mis-
joinder, of course, is the inclusion of an improper person as a
party. Under Rule 19, failure to join an indispensable party would
appear to be ground for dismissal.
RULE 22. Rule 22 provides the procedure relating to inter-
pleading. There is little change from that provided by the Code.
Coming from the Federal Interpleader Statute, the Rule is short
and clear and requires no comment.
RULE 23. The rule relating to class actions, as set forth in
Rule 23, is substantially a restatement of the Code provision. Note
that it is provided in (b), relating to representative suits, that
such an action can now be maintained only by one who was a
shareholder at the time the transaction complained of occurred
or whose share devolved upon him by operation of law.
RULE 24. Rule 24 relates to intervention and provides for
permissive and mandatory intervention. The recent amendments
have enlarged the area of permissive intervention, particularly in
that changes have been made to permit the intervention of govern-
mental officers or agencies in proper cases.
RULE 25. The provisions of Rule 25 for substitution of parties
is clear and little used. It brings nothing new into the practice
beyond the provision for dismissal of the action as to a deceased
party if substitution is not timely made.
"ALWAYS BOOST YOUR FELLOW LAWYERS"
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